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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. While Jeffry Black was the Executive Director of the Peace Officer 
Standards and Training Council, POST, as it is known, suffered significant budgetary 
mismanagement. As the Director of the Idaho State Police, within which POST exists, Col. G. 
Jerry Russell sought to correct the situation. But Jeffry Black repeatedly and deliberately refused 
to follow Col. Russell's lawful and proper instructions aimed at remedying the financial mess 
that Black's decisions created. He told Col. Russell that he did not have to follow Col. Russell's 
instructions because Col. Russell had no authority to give them. So Col. Russell fired him for 
general incompetence and insubordination. 
Black made the same argument to the Idaho Personnel Commission, which rejected his 
appeal. He did not appeal that decision to district court, and filed this Whistleblower Act case. 
Black now understands that Col. Russell did have the authority to give the directions at issue. 
Nevertheless, he seeks protection under the Whistleblower Act because he says his articulation 
of his beliefs about Col. Russell's authority and his refusal to follow instructions was reasonable. 
The theory goes that because Black thought Col. Russell lacked the authority to give the 
directions at issue, he thought the directions were illegal, and so he could not be fired for failing 
to follow them. The district court rejected this argument, and now Black asks this Court to hold 
that the Whistleblower Act should protect this sort of activity. 
Course of proceedings. The defendants-respondents generally agree with Black's 
statement of the course of trial court proceedings (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 2). 
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The facts. POST is a division of the Idaho State Police. Idaho Code§ 19-5102. It has a 
limited role in law enforcement, which can generally be described as providing training, 
education, and certification for Idaho law enforcement officers. Idaho Code§ 19-5117. At the 
time relevant to this case, its Executive Director was selected by the POST Council subject to 
approval by the Director of the Idaho State Police. 1 R., p. 112. The POST Executive Director is, 
by rule, a State Police employee and serves at the direction of the POST Council for carrying out 
the POST Council's duties. IDAPA 11.01.031.02. For administrative purposes, the POST 
Executive Director and his staff are governed by the policies and rules of the State and the State 
Police, concerning, but not limited to, fiscal, purchasing, and personnel matters. IDAP A 
11.11.01.031.04. 
Colonel Dan Charboneau, then the Director of the Idaho State Police, hired Jeffry Black 
as POST's Executive Director in July 2006. Col. Charboneau's appointment letter makes plain 
that he would be Black's "direct supervisor." R., p. 135. Colonel Charboneau conducted 
Black's 2006 performance evaluation and, other than Black's, his is the only signature on the 
document. R., p. 137. Colonel G. Jerry Russell became the State Police Director in January 
2007. R., p. 112. Colonel Russell conducted Black's 2007 and 2008 performance evaluations. 
R., pp. 145, 151. On each, the only signature other than Black's was Col. Russell's. 
Marsi Woody is the State Police Financial Executive Officer. In November 2008, she 
alerted Col. Russell to something of a financial problem. R., p. 114. Cash-on-hand at POST was 
1 The POST rules were changed in 2010. The rules in place for the relevant time periods in this 
case are found in the Record at pages 132 and 133. References in this brief to the rules will be to 
the then-effective version unless otherwise noted. 
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nearly gone and POST would not be able to pay its bills-including payroll-through the end of 
the month. R., p. 114. Concerned with this deficit, Col. Russell met with Black and another 
POST staffer to discuss how to fix the situation. R., p. 114. As he looked into the situation 
further, Col. Russell became even more concerned that Black and POST staff were not fully 
aware or in control of POST revenues and expenditures and that they lacked the internal controls 
necessary to properly manage the POST budget. R., pp. 115-16. It turns out there were 
numerous financial issues afoot at POST, one of which was Black's decision to purchase 
software called "Liquid Office." R., p. 115. Colonel Russell authorized a transfer of $50,000 
from the State Police to meet POST's immediate financial needs. R, p. 116. 
The financial problems at POST caused other problems. An example: POST's primary 
function is to train and certify law enforcement officers. New hires needing POST certification 
must obtain it within a year of hire. R., pp. 116-17. It is critical, then, that POST conduct 
training academies on a regular basis. R., p. 117. But as POST's cash declined, Black cancelled 
academies to reduce operating costs. R., p. 117. This created hardships for the local and state 
agencies that needed their new hires to obtain POST certification in a timely manner. R., p. 117. 
Colonel Russell held a meeting with Black and other State Police and POST staffers in 
late November 2008 to discuss his concerns regarding the lack of oversight and cost controls for 
the POST budget. R., p. 117. Colonel Russell directed Black and another POST staffer to take 
immediate control of POST's fiscal matters. R., p. 117. But Black told Col. Russell he 
answered only to POST. R., p. 117. Colonel Russell informed Black, though, that in fact the 
ultimate responsibility for the POST budget was his, not Black's, and that POST rules establish 
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that the POST Executive Director is governed by State Police rules and policies on fiscal, 
purchasing, and personnel matters. R., p. 117. Colonel Russell directed Black to provide him 
with a memo explaining the causes for POST's fiscal year 2009 budget deficit and proposing 
ways to balance the budget for the remainder of the fiscal year. R., p. 118. He explained, too, 
that if Black were to meet with POST Council members to discuss POST budget matters, he-as 
Black's direct supervisor-would be present at any such meetings. R., p. 118. Colonel Russell 
memorialized the directives in a letter to Black the same day. R., p. 175. 
Black responded to Col. Russell the next day by email. He told Col. Russell that under 
Idaho Code § 19-5116 the POST budget was "clearly under the direction of the POST Council." 
R., p. 188. He included a copy of the statute in his email. The same day, Black provided 
Colonel Russell a memorandum explaining the "convergence of events" that he thought created 
the financial quagmire POST was in. R., p. 190. He did not explain, though, how he intended to 
fix POST's budgetary problems. R., p. 118. 
At POST' s December 2008 council meeting, the Council held an executive session to 
discuss Black's performance and Col. Russell's attempts to intervene in the budget situation and 
supervise Black's path toward control of POST's budget. R., p. 119. The POST Council also 
discussed Black's resistance to Col. Russell's directions to Black about the POST budget. R., p. 
119. Back in open session, the Council entertained a motion to direct Black to cooperate with 
Col. Russell and answer to Col. Russell with regard to the fiscal matters relating to POST. R., p. 
193. It passed unanimously. R., p. 193. 
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Alas, POST's fiscal woes continued. In January 2009 Col. Russell expressed to Black in 
a letter his concerns about the continuing problems and directed Black to implement a list of 
changes to correct POST's situation. R., p. 199. Black had asked that a financial specialist, Lori 
Guthrie, be relocated on a trial basis from State Police financial offices to the POST operations 
building to provide support to POST's financial staff. R., p. 120. Colonel Russell approved the 
move. 
POST had other problems, namely management and employee morale issues. When Col. 
Russell learned of these problems, he directed Steve Raschke, a State Police Executive Officer, 
to conduct a management audit of POST. R., p. 121. This audit, called the Audit Report, 
included interviews of all POST staffers and disclosed several concerns. R., p. 121. Colonel 
Russell gave Black a copy of the report on June 15, 2009 and asked for Black's response by the 
29th. R., p. 122. No response came. R., p. 122. Near the end of July, Col. Russell and Black 
met. Among the topics of discussion was Col. Russell's decision to end Lori Guthrie's trial run 
at POST and bring her back to the State Police financial offices. Colonel Russell determined that 
her presence at POST had not helped the situation and so he directed Black to coordinate Ms. 
Guthrie's return with Marsi Woody, the Financial Executive Officer. R., pp. 122 & 224. 
Meanwhile, Black's response to the Audit Report finally came on July 31. Black said he 
would not address findings he deemed outside his control or that represented less than 30 per 
cent of staff responses. R., p. 226. On August 3, Col. Russell sent Black a memo explaining that 
he did not think that Black's response demonstrated an adequate appreciation of the matters in 
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the Audit Report. R., pp. 123 & 229-31. He made specific requests related to the issues in the 
Audit Report and asked for a response by August 28. R., p. 123. 
Halfway through August, Ms. Guthrie had still not been relocated to the State Police 
financial offices. Black sent Col. Russell a letter on August 12 saying he did not think relocating 
Ms. Guthrie to the State Police financial offices was a good idea and told Col. Russell that he, 
not Col. Russell, had supervisory authority over POST employees. R., pp. 123-24 & 233. Based 
on this response, Col. Russell did not think Black was getting the message. Colonel Russell 
stated in his affidavit submitted in support of the State Police's motion for summary judgment: 
In my view, Mr. Black's plan for addressing the POST budget problems was 
wholly inadequate and appeared to be nothing more than a perfunctory response 
to my directive. It gave me no confidence that he appreciated the importance of 
the situation or that he had developed a plan for addressing the problems that were 
largely of his making. 
R., p. 124. 
Near the end of August, Marsi Woody sent Col. Russell a memo recapping POST's 
budget year and identifying other issues related to POST's continuing inability to manage its 
fiscal affairs. R., pp. 124 & 237-38. That prompted Col. Russell to send Black a follow-up 
memo explaining, again, that he, not Black, had supervisory authority over POST employees and 
again directed Black to accomplish Ms. Guthrie's return to the State Police financial offices as 
soon as possible. R., pp. 124-25 & 240-41. In response, Black sent Col. Russell a letter saying 
he would not respond further to the Audit Report and left the clear impression he would not be 
relocating Ms. Guthrie. R., pp. 243-44. 
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Colonel Russell regarded Black's response as insubordinate and a demonstrated refusal to 
cooperate. R., p. 125. So he issued a Notice of Contemplated Action proposing to fire Black, in 
which he identified the basis for the decision and detailed Black's failures. R., pp. 246-50. 
Black responded through counsel, who posited that Black answered only to the POST Council 
and that Black could not be disciplined for his insubordination. R., pp. 258-61. Colonel Russell 
dismissed Black by letter on November 5. 
Black appealed that decision to the Idaho Personnel Commission. He argued that Col. 
Russell's directives need not be followed, but the hearing officer disagreed and concluded that 
the facts supported Col. Russell's decision to fire Black. R., pp. 73-84. On review, the 
commission agreed with the hearing officer, finding that indeed, Col. Russell had the authority 
Black claimed he did not and finding proper cause for Black's dismissal. Finding Black's 
arguments "wholly unreasonable," R., p. 101, the commission summed up its decision this way: 
"Black refused to follow reasonable orders and assignments from an authorized supervisor. This 
refusal to accept and follow reasonable and proper assignments from Colonel Russell is 
insubordination and is proper cause for disciplinary action pursuant to [Personnel Commission] 
Rule 190.01.d and e." R., p. 108-09. 
Black did not appeal the decision of the Personnel Commission. The decision is final and 
conclusive between Black and the State Police. Idaho Code§§ 67-5317(3); 67-5318. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BLACK FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE ENGAGED IN ACTIVITY 
THAT THE WHISTLEBLOWER ACT PROTECTS 
A. Statutory Framework and Legal Standards 
Commonly known as the Whistleblower Act, the Idaho Protection of Public Employees 
Act, Idaho Code §§ 6-2101-2109, "seeks to 'protect the integrity of government by providing a 
legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as 
a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation.'" Mallonee v. State, 139 
Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004). The cause of action is described thusly: 
To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this section, the employee 
shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee has 
suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a person acting on his behalf 
engaged or intended to engage in activity protected under section 6-2104, Idaho 
Code. 
Idaho Code§ 6-2105(4). 
Two of the provisions of section 6-2104 are at issue in this case. Black alleged that the 
State Police violated what will be called the communication clause (§ 6-2104(1)(a)) and the 
refusal clause (§ 6-2104(3)). These sections prevent an employer from taking adverse action 
against an employee because the employee either "communicates in good faith the existence of 
any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, 
rule, or regulation," or, "has objected to or refused to carry out a directive that the employee 
reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation .... " Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1)(a) & (3). 
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"Good faith," as used in section 6-2104(1)(a), requires a "reasonable basis in fact" for the 
communication. Id., at (l)(b). 
In addition to arguing that the district court got the substance of the case wrong, Black 
identifies two other faults with the court's decision that merit mention here. First, Black 
contends that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in analyzing whether Black 
engaged in any activity that the Whistleblower Act protects. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 
11. He says that the court applied the standards in the common-law public policy exception to 
the at-will employment rule, see Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho at 621, 84 P.3d at 557, rather than 
the controlling statutory standards of the Whistleblower Act. 
The district court did no such thing. The State Police argued at summary judgment that 
the undisputed facts demonstrated that Black engaged in no protected activity, and the district 
court understood that its task on summary judgment was to determine whether the undisputed 
facts demonstrated that Black engaged in protected activity. R., p. 518. The court correctly 
recognized that protected activity, as the term is used in section 6-2105, was "only defined by 
reference to LC. § 6-2104." R., p. 518. The district court's analysis demonstrates it understood 
that to determine whether Black engaged in protected activity, it had to evaluate whether the 
undisputed facts constituted a communication in good faith about a violation of law or a refusal 
to carry out a directive that Black reasonably believed violated the law. R. pp. 519-23. 
The district court recognized, too, that where the facts were not disputed, determining 
whether certain conduct met the statutory standard was a question of law. R., p. 523 
("Determining what constitutes public policy sufficient to protect an employee from termination 
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for whistleblowing is a question of law pursuant to Mallonee"). This is the sentence Black 
points to, but the district court's reference to Mallonee did not mean what Black thinks it meant. 
The question whether a plaintiff has satisfied the provisions of the Whistleblower Act involves 
mixed questions of law and fact. The factual questions, for example, may involve the causal 
requirements or whether a communication was made, or whether the communication was in good 
faith, or whether the employee objected to a directive. The cases demonstrate, though, that if the 
facts of the conduct alleged to be protected are undisputed, the question whether that conduct is 
protected activity within the meaning of section 6-2014 is a question oflaw. See, e.g., Patterson 
v. Department of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 256 P.3d 718 (2011); Van v. Portneuf Med. 
Ctr., 147 Idaho 52, 559, 212 P.3d 382, 989 (2009). In its decision the district court examined 
whether Black telling Col. Russell his orders were lacking authority and his refusal to follow 
them constituted protected activity. R., pp. 519-23. The district court's decision shows that it 
properly viewed the issue as presenting a question of law and that the question was whether the 
conduct at issue was protected activity within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 6-2105. 
Second, Black asserts that the district court incorrectly ruled that in order to merit 
protection under the refusal provision, he was required to show that the refused directive was, in 
fact, illegal. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 21. Again, no. Black admitted in his deposition 
that the thing he was directed to do was not in and of itself illegal (R., p. 584); rather, he claimed 
that the illegality stemmed from the fact that Col. Russell had no authority to give the directions 
at issue. In differentiating a protected refusal from the refusal in this case, the court simply 
explained that whatever Black's belief, the sort of illegality that Black claimed was not the sort 
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protected by the act. R., p. 522 ("There is a critical difference between questioning legal 
authority to give an order and questioning the legality of what is ordered"). 
B. The Facts Do Not Support A Claim Under Either The Communication 
Clause Or the Refusal Clause Of The Whistleblower Act 
Black's argument comes down to this: The Whistleblower Act should protect his 
insubordinate conduct because his refusal to carry out lawful, proper directions from his 
supervisor was based on his mistaken belief about the law. Because that belief was reasonable, 
he says, he is shielded from termination for failing to follow directions. The evidence in the 
record does not, however, support the claim that his communications or refusals implicated a 
violation or suspected violation of a law or rule. His conduct amounts to a personal 
disagreement with the Director of the State Police, and the Court should decline his invitation to 
apply the act to conduct it is not intended to protect. Additionally, the evidence in the record 
demonstrates that Black's mistaken beliefs were not objectively reasonable. 
1. Black did not engage in any protected activity because his mistaken belief 
about his supervisor's authority and his refusal to follow lawful, proper 
directions based on that mistaken belief do not implicate violations of any 
law or rule. 
Common to both the communication clause and the refusal clause is the requirement that 
the employee's communication or refusal implicate the potential or actual violation of a law or 
rule. Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., supra. Black says his statements to Col. Russell about Col. 
Russell's authority and his refusal to follow Col. Russell's lawful and proper directions on that 
basis satisfy this requirement. But Black's mistaken belief of Col. Russell's authority in no way 
implicated a potential violation of a law or rule. 
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Neither side disputes that Black was told to do nothing illegal. He was not ordered to 
commit a battery, violate anyone's civil rights, cook books, shred evidence, falsify certifications, 
vandalize cars, park in a no-parking area, or anything that would have required him to violate a 
law. Rather, Black believed the orders were illegal because they were made by someone without 
authority to give them. Questioning and defying authority is not the same as communicating a 
potential violation of law or refusing a directive that the employee reasonably believes is illegal. 
Even if Col. Russell did not have the authority to give the directives at issue, Black has not 
demonstrated that any of them would implicate a suspected violation or violation of a law or 
rule. In fact, he admitted nothing he was told to do would have forced him to violate the law. 
R., p. 584. With no violation oflaw or rule implicated by Col. Russell's conduct, there can be no 
protected activity. 
Black has identified no decision from this Court, another state, or the federal system that 
supports his claim that questioning and defying a lawful order from a direct supervisor is 
protected so long as the employee believes the person giving the order had no authority to give it. 
This is for good reason. Indeed, Black's preferred outcome here has sweeping implications that 
are irreconcilable with the statutes and rules related to public employment. Refusing lawful 
orders and insubordination, are, of course, bases for disciplinary action of a public employee. 
IDAPA 15.04.01.190 d. & e. The basis for Black's termination in this case was multiple failures 
to follow two directives related to matters clearly within Col. Russell's authority. These were of 
course lawful and proper orders, and Black does not argue that they were some sort of pretext for 
some other reason. Thus, were Black to prevail, any employee would be free to disregard proper 
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orders from a direct supervisor-in this case, the director of a state agency, no less-and survive 
summary judgment in a Whistleblower Act case simply by articulating a belief that the 
supervisor in question was not authorized to give the order. This would disrupt public 
employers' ability to maintain order within their organizations. As this Court has noted, 
"[a]lthough an employer cannot expect employees to at all times be absolutely docile or servile, 
it can expect employees to comply with the employer's legitimate direct orders." Stark v. 
Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 152 Idaho 506, 509, 272 P.3d 478, 481 (2012). 
Black's claims here amount to a personal disagreement between him and the director of 
an organization about the organizational hierarchy and the relative authorities of positions within 
the organizations. Such personal disputes about organizational matters are different than reports 
of waste or violations of law and refusals to carry out orders that violate the law. This Court 
should recognize a limiting principle that effectuates the Legislature's intent to protect 
employees who bring to light waste or violations of law. It should not protect employees who 
refuse lawful orders simply on a mistaken belief about who one's supervisor is. 
2. Even if Black's conduct implicated a violation of law or rule, his beliefs that 
the orders violated a law or rule are not reasonable. 
The district court did not rule on the question whether Black's communication was in 
good faith or his refusal to follow directions at issue was reasonable. And because Black's 
communications and refusals did not implicate the violation or suspected violation of a law, this 
Court need not, either. Nevertheless, the record demonstrates the answer to either question is 
properly negative. 
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The statutes and rules establish the State Police Director's powers and duties and the 
relationship between POST and the State Police. The Director of the Idaho State Police is of 
course the head of an executive agency. He therefore has the authority to supervise, direct, 
account for, organize, plan, administer and execute the functions within the department, establish 
policy to be followed by the department employees, establish and make appointments, remove 
employees, transfer employees between positions, and change the duties of employees, among 
other things. Idaho Code § 67-2405. The Director also has the powers and duties "necessary to 
carry out the proper administration of the state police .... " Idaho Code § 67-2901. 
Nothing about the POST Council statutes indicate Col. Russell lacked the authority that 
Black denied. The prior equivalent to today's POST Council used to be a free-standing board 
that had the authority to hire and fire the POST Executive Director. See 1969 Idaho Sess. Laws, 
ch. 415, § 2, p. 1151; § 13, p. 1154. In 1980, the predecessor council was absorbed into what 
was then the Department of Law Enforcement and became the POST Council. See Atty. Gen. 
Op. No. 90-5, Jun 28, 1990 (R. pp. 57-64) (explaining POST Council has no authority to hire and 
fire employees); 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 307, §§ 1, 2, pp. 628-32. The POST Council exists 
within the State Police. Idaho Code § 19-5102. Generally speaking, the POST Council 
establishes requirements for training and education of peace officers, approves training schools, 
establishes minimum standards for peace officers, and maintains records. It can expend funds 
from the POST fund for certain enumerated purposes. Idaho Code § 19-5116. And the POST 
Council may promulgate rules to carry out its duties. Idaho Code § 19-5107. 
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The POST-related statutes do not authorize the creation of POST employees or the 
creation of an Executive Director. The POST Council created the Executive Director position 
through its rules. See IDAP A 11.11.01.031. Those rules establish that the POST Council selects 
the Executive Director subject to the approval of the Director of the Idaho State Police. IDAP A 
11.11.01.031.b. The POST Executive Director is a State Police employee and serves at the 
direction of the POST Council for carrying out the POST Council's duties. IDAPA 
11.01.031.02. For administrative purposes, the POST Executive Director and his staff are 
governed by the policies and rules of the State and the State Police, concerning, but not limited 
to, fiscal, purchasing, and personnel matters. ID APA 11.11.01.031.04. It should not have been a 
surprise, then, that Col. Russell, the Director of the State Police, had the authority to direct 
Black's activities at least with respect to fiscal, purchasing, and personnel matters. See, e.g., 
Zirkle v. District of Columbia, 830 A.2d 1250, 1260 (D.C. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that where 
D.C. Office of Tax & Revenue policy was clearly a proper exercise of discretion, "someone with 
[the employee's] background and expertise could not reasonably believe that [the employee's 
supervisor] Mr. Branham's order, made pursuant to that policy, was illegal"). 
Other facts, too, demonstrate the umeasonableness of Black's claim that he did not think 
Col. Russell had the authority to give the directions at issue. Black was notified in his 
appointment letter that the State Police Director was his "direct supervisor." Col. Russell 
provided Black numerous verbal and written notifications that he did, in fact, have the authority 
to give the directions at issue. His annual performance evaluations conducted by the Director of 
the State Police should have told him that he was under the supervision of the State Police 
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Director. And finally, the POST Council-the very entity Black said he did answer to--
instructed him to follow Col. Russell's directions with respect to fiscal matters. 
Black identifies a handful of items in the record he says demonstrate the reasonableness 
of his belief. He points out that in his prior experience with what was then the Idaho Department 
of Law Enforcement (from 1981 through 1996) he "developed the understanding" that the POST 
Executive Director answered to the POST Council and that during that time he "saw 
organizational charts" indicating the Executive Director of POST was on an "equal level" with 
the State Police Director. R., p. 317. He claims that the organizational chart at the time of his 
hire substantiates this. R., pp. 311 & 318. It is odd, then, that the exhibit he attached to that very 
affidavit shows the POST Executive Director squarely underneath the State Police Director. R., 
p. 359. 
He also points to his affidavit where he recounts ten years of personal interaction with the 
POST Executive Director during his previous stint with the Department of Law Enforcement, 
discussions with those previous Executive Directors, discussions with previous State Police 
Directors, his personal review of chapter 51, title 19, and IDAPA 11.11.01, and his discussions 
with the then-POST Council chairman. His generalized statements about his impressions of 
conversations he had illustrate his subjective belief and do not make his beliefs any more 
reasonable in light of objective facts showing that Col. Russell had the authority to give the 
directives in question. 
Black attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of his refusal by pointing to his own 
deposition testimony, where he explains his view of the IDAPA rules. Appellant's Opening 
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Brief, pp. 28, 29. This testimony simply reflects a mistaken belief about the organizational 
structure of the State Police. But the statutes and rules are clear, and the directives given fall 
easily within the purview of the Director of the Idaho State Police. Even if the POST rules did 
not quite square with state statutes, the Executive Director of POST ought to know that statutes 
trump rules. Druffel v. Dep't. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002). 
Black claims also that the June 7, 2007 minutes of a POST Council meeting"establish a 
history of disputes between POST Council and [the State Police] regarding the role of the entity'.' 
Appellanfs Opening Brief, p. 30. The minutes speak for themselves, but it is plain that they do 
not establish the sort of conflict Black thinks. The cited pages, in the record at pages 397-400, 
indicate that the conversation started when Black presented a potential request by a local sheriff 
to make POST a self-governing state agency. R., p. 397. 
Black also argues that Richard Juengling-then the Standards, Certifications and Support 
Manager at POS±-mncluded that the POST Executive Director reports to the POST Council. 
Appellanfs Opening Brief, p. 30. A lower-level employee's legal conclusion about the 
organizational structure of the State Police in no way supplies objective evidence that Black's 
belief was reasonable. 
Black asks the Court, too, to consider''the unique position held by Black;'who, after all, 
held ''a unique function: policing the police, including [the State Police]:' Appellanfs Opening 
Brief, p. 31. The Executive Director of POST does not "polic[ e] the police'.' He carries out the 
limited duties of the POST Council, which deal with training and certifying law enforcement 
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officers. And besides, there is no "unique employee" exception to the requirements of the 
Whistleblower Act. Black has to demonstrate he engaged in protected activity, and he has not. 
Black's conduct should also be viewed in light of what he did not do. One would think 
that an employee being directed to do something by someone who lacked the authority to do it 
would take the matter to the person or body whose authority he thought was being invaded. 
Black can point to nothing in the record that shows he ever took what he viewed as an improper 
assertion of authority to the body he argues had the authority to direct him. He cannot show 
anything to indicate the POST Council adopted his view. He cannot point to any act he was 
requested to do that conflicted with a directive of the POST Council or violated a law or rule. He 
states that he wanted to "force the issue" with Col. Russell and get a resolution to Black's 
disagreement. R., pp. 611-12. But he is not entitled to defy lawful and proper directives until he 
is satisfied that they are lawful. 
The statutes and rules plainly establish that the Executive Director of POST is a State 
Police employee. He carries out the limited and specific duties of the POST Council. The POST 
Council rules themselves demonstrate that the Executive Director and his staff are governed by 
the policies and rules of the State and the State Police, "concerning but not limited to fiscal, 
purchasing and personnel matters." ID APA 11.11.01.031.04. The directions Black refused to 
follow were lawful and proper and Black cannot demonstrate his communications or refusals 
implicated a violation or suspected violation of law. 
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II. BLACK IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
On the assumption that he will prevail in this appeal, Black seeks attorney fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 6-2106. That section states that a court "may" award attorney fees in issuing a 
judgment. The use of "may" indicates the decision whether to award fees is committed to the 
discretion of the court. See Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P.3d 367, 376 (2004). 
Other than the assumption of a victory, Black has not provided this Court with a basis for the 
Court to exercise its discretion and award him attorney fees--even if he should prevail here. He 
has not pointed to any fact or decision of this Court to guide it in considering the claim. With no 
basis for an award of attorney fees, this Court should deny the request. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgment should be affirmed. 
* * * 
Dated September 10, 2012. 
By: 
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